By Mwalimu George Ngwane*
In an article captioned “Lukewarm attitudes in some Administrations” Eulalia Amabo of Cameroon Tribune states,
“the law that institutes the publication of bilingual documents in English and French is not being respected by all….posters affixed on doors indicating the post of responsibility of an official in most Ministries are unfortunately still in one language.”
As a matter of fact, complaints or petitions received by this author about the non-compliance of Official languages especially the respect of the official minority language (English) in written documents has become fashionable. This must be one of the reasons some public users in Cameroon have been advocating sanctions to be taken against institutions that are non-compliant in promoting bilingualism.
What should be done if and when individuals and institutions fail to comply with promoting or protecting minority language rights?
Do language bodies have the enforceable legal and regulatory instruments or provisions to penalise or prosecute the non-compliance of language policy or standard towards minority language?
Can routine sensitisations alone on the respect of language policy raise enough permanent awareness on and consistent compliance with minority language rights?
Is the official task of transmitting reports and recommendations to other arms of government (Executive, Judicial, and Legislature) not inimical to the performance and potency of language bodies?
Can language bodies effectively play the role of human right defenders?
These are some of the questions the public keeps asking and these questions point to the credibility and power (or lack of) of language bodies. It has been argued that the fact that most language bodies are advisory and consultative relatively limits their powers to enforce their own laws. If the fundamental key word in language rights is “compliance” (the process of respecting citizens’ rights to being served in the language of their choice) and if language bodies have a complaint factor, then they should inadvertently be equipped with a law enforcement regulatory instrument that call perpetual defaulters to order. One of the vexing problems with relevant persons or public/private entities is their inconsistent and sometimes condescending response to compliance. One observes the relentless efforts made by language bodies towards sensitisation. Yet one also observes the loud rhetoric by public hierarchy of public users’ entitlement to language choice as well as their self-aggrandising achievements to language compliance, but these fall flat on the face of empirical evidence and disaggregated data within their work environment.
To some officials in the public and private entities, protecting minority language rights is a mere distracting drumbeat. These officials respond to minority language rights more with episodic knee-jerk reflexes instead of systemic institutionalised reforms.
In his article “Of Tongues and Teeth: the enforcement powers of Canada’s language Commissioners”, Francois Larocque states “Language Commissioners in Canada, like all ombudsman, have no power to order government officials and departments to comply with language laws. Their influence is persuasive, rather than coercive, and it stems from the Commissioners’ independence from government and from their moral authority as champions of constitutional and quasi-constitutional rights.”
Larocque continues “certain powers are required for the Commissioner to effectively carry out their mandates, including the powers to investigate, to make findings and recommendations, to report to parliament and to the public and to seize the courts in appropriate circumstances. It is those powers that give persuasive force to language commissioners.”
In recent years however some language bodies have had their enforcement powers strengthened by the law creating them or improvised by their own vision on compliance and investigations under what they call a REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF STANDARDS. For example, Francois Larocque observes that “following the Official Languages Act in Canada, the Commissioner may also exercise his persuasive influence to ensure that any decision that is made, is implemented and that action is taken on the recommendations made in respect of an investigation. In other circumstances, the language body can enforce the law by reporting the non-compliance institution to Parliament, Court or President of the Republic depending on its legal landscape.” This brings to fore the power of reports and recommendation made by language bodies. After complaints have been lodged, investigation carried out and reports/recommendations forwarded, it is crucial for the indicted individual or institution to be called to order promptly. In order to make an objective appraisal of compliance report by organisations, language bodies go through various phases. For example, the Welsh Language Commissioner will wish to receive further information and a higher level of assurance from organisations regarding their compliance with standards. The Welsh Language Standards Regulations require an organisation to provide information requested by the Commissioner which relates to compliance with particular standards.
Without a sustainable law enforcement plan, the bulwark of activities carried out by language bodies shall be hardly appreciated by the public.
If enforcement powers cannot be given to language bodies, then they (language bodies) may have to resort to policies of self-sanctions or self-regulation and soft-sanctions or soft-regulations to institutions.
Self-sanction includes the policy of incentives or bilingual bonus. According to Paul Simo, “to apprehend the broader structural environment for state/public employees in Cameroon (it could be any other country) and to achieve competency and serve the public in both official languages, it is necessary to examine the recruitment criteria, training content, in-service incentives and other personal polices relevant to requiring official language bilingualism from state employees.”
Bilingual bonus aims to encourage and motivate official language proficiency. This entails appointing civil servants to bilingual positions on the basis of their qualification and their language skill sets or competencies. Generally, the designated bilingual positions are categorised under Imperative and non-Imperative appointment (Canada approach) or Essential or Desirable appointments (Welsh approach). An Imperative appointment means that the bilingual requirements of the position must be met at the time of appointment. A non-Imperative appointment is based on administrative merit even if the person does not have official language proficiency.
In other words, the person may be very technically qualified for the position but lacks a mastery of the second language. In such a case, the person would have to sign an undertaking to undergo language training for some years and be tested regularly, with training expenses borne by the institution. If after the training, the person is still deficient in his or her official second language, the training period can be extended or the person deployed to another position with similar level and salary.
Another self-sanction strategy to individuals is the recruitment policy especially for public servants. In Ireland 20% of all new recruits to the public sector must be functional bilinguals. The individual’s choice between being a functional biliterate bilingual or an incipient passive bilingual is a self-sanction in its own right. It is the same with institutions that fail to comply with bilingual standards. Most of such institutions sanction themselves through linguistic tensions between the workers, skewed branding and marketing of the institution, and consequently mitigated output from the institution. This is more serious with the private or business sectors where their performance is also connected to market forces. Language bodies are often foresighted to include standards on official languages even for the private sector. The question of course still remains, what can these language bodies do to those private entities that fail to comply with the promotion and protection of minority languages.
A few recommendations by way of soft-sanctions or self-regulation come to mind:
First, the Language bodies should reinforce the visibility of language standards through the publication of posters, handouts, flyers, plaques, all placed in public places as well as a robust media outlet that carries out sustainable sensitisation messages. With a plethora of aggressive sensitisation and sporadic unannounced visits to public entities, sanctions become more justified.
Second, the creation of a distinct Monitoring/Compliance department is crucial in a language body. It shall be charged with ensuring that services for the public comply with the requirements of the language bodies and requirements of users.
Third, there is a need for the Monitoring/Compliance department to conceive a non-compliance Act which shall permit language bodies to serve non-compliant institutions or individuals with compliance notices or letters of observation. This department may also issue queries and explore the possibility of imposing a civil penalty on a public entity or individual for failing to comply.
In Wales, if the Commissioner suspects that an organisation is failing to comply with its language scheme, whether by means of a complaint received or by holding reviews or investigations, she may hold a statutory investigation under section 17 of the Welsh Language Act 1993 to decide if there was a failure. In case of failure the Commissioner has the possibility of imposing a civil penalty of about $5000 on a relevant person for failing to comply.
Fourth, a language body may create a functional Investigation section. Enforcement laws most often begin with investigation. Anyone who has failed to receive a language service from a public organisation, or if not satisfied with the standard of the language service received can make a complaint to the language body either through a toll-free number or asking for an audience with the language body or writing directly to the language body. In Wales, a user can complain to the Commissioner about an organisation’s failure to comply with a standard, about an organisation’s failure to implement its Welsh language scheme or if he or she feels that someone has interfered with his or her freedom to use the Welsh language in Wales. After a meeting or discussion with the user who lodges the complaint, the language body may write a letter of observation to the accused entity or invite it for a discussion. In the Ontario Ombudsman, anyone who hinders, obstructs or fails to comply with an investigation of Ombudsman is liable on conviction to a fine of not more than $500 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three months or both.
Fifth, the language body can institute an annual Good Practice policy or Honours System for institutions. Institutions like to be recognised when they abide by the policies drafted in any domain. One such motivation and incentive would be to highlight the compliance performance of any institution as a case study of good practices in respecting and/or protecting minority language rights. Celebrating or commending the efforts of such an institution is a way of encouraging the performance of other institutions. Practically, each year a monitoring and evaluation of good practices can be carried out by language bodies to showcase the “Top Ten” Institutions on good practices in compliance. Good practice policy is both an incentive for compliance and a “name and shame” soft sanction for non-compliance. In fact, the Welsh Language Commissioner has established an Encouraging good practice system. This system is to help organisations improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of their Welsh language provision which the Commissioner will be searching for established successful practices. Once examples have been identified, she will analyse those practices. If they are practices that can be shown to work well and have been proven and validated over a period of time, the Commissioner will promote those practices to other organisations.
Sixth, holding events such as, Official language clinics, Town hall meetings, discussion groups in communities or focal persons in public entities across the country gives members of the public an opportunity to talk about their experiences of using minority language services. In some cases, frequent workshops, seminars, symposiums and colloquiums are held with civil society or non-state actors. The aim is to animate discussions, to identify gaps (knowledge gaps, coordination gaps, resource gaps etc), to see whether the findings of any monitoring work, and to confirm if organisations’ knowledge align with people’s real experiences. Questions are also asked in a telephone survey.
Seventh, making Annual Reports to the public gives the public a better judgment of who is not complying. Such Report needs a section on complaints from users and action taken by the language body to address the complaints.
Eighth, According to Paul Simo “As incentives for public service bilingualism, initiate pre-graduation bilingualism proficiency requirement especially in the higher state institutions or “Grandes Ecoles” leading to public service employment; include bilingualism proficiency among annual performance evaluation criteria for civil servants; evaluate bilingualism proficiency for access to managerial posts; and institute pre-posting review of official language proficiencies prior to Ministry/Entity wide appointment and transfer decisions.” This recommendation is basically to immerse students of state schools directly into a bilingual proficiency frame of mind that would avoid self-sanctions in the course of their professional career. It must be however noted that written bilingualism is a capital intensive item which may require a bilingualism budget to be incorporated in state budget and clearly identified in the budget of each state Ministry or Corporation.
Finally, in virtual every state of the nation address, the Head of state reminds Cameroonians on the scourge of corruption, reminding our fellow Cameroonians on the necessity of language compliance as well could be an added value to effective bilingualism and law enforcement policy. Even though it is ideal for language bodies to maintain their primordial role of promoting and protecting minority language rights, mutation and adaptation to variant language ecosystems are known to have occurred in some countries.
However, and whenever these adaptations, variations or mutations occur, international and domestic legal instruments as well as language bodies should always strive to listen to one main thematic voice which is “Minority language rights are Human Rights.”
*Writer and policy Advocate. This essay is excerpted from his new book *Protecting Minority Language rights”, Spears publication, U.S.A, 2023.