By Clement N Nkumbe
Legal and Human Rights Expert, Nkumbe Clement
Elections are always governed by two somewhat distinct principles: legality (the formal institutions, rules, statutes, courts) and legitimacy (the genuine consent and will of the people). Often they align; but when they diverge, a profound democratic crisis results.
In the 2025 presidential elections in Cameroon, both principles are in sharp conflict.
The legal dimension
According to Cameroon’s constitutional scheme, final and binding results for the presidential election are proclaimed by the Constitutional Council. The electoral code emphasises that only the Council may officially declare the winner. In the current case, the Council endorsed Biya as winner with 53.66 % of the vote. From the standpoint of legality, therefore, Biya’s presidency is valid: the institutional requirements for proclamation have been followed and the Council’s decision is final.
The legitimacy dimension
But legality alone does not guarantee legitimacy. Legitimacy demands that the people believe the outcome genuinely reflects their free and fair will. Here Tchiroma’s camp contends something quite different: that he “won the popular vote” and that the official result is a distortion of that will. Tchiroma declared himself the winner shortly after polling stations closed — citing tally sheets collected by his agents and returning results that put him in first place (he specified figures of 54.8 % to Biya’s 31.3 %). He resolved not to accept what he calls a stolen vote. Thus the legitimacy claim is that the “people’s will” lies with Tchiroma, and any formal declaration contrary to that will is illegitimate, despite being legal.
Arguing for Tchiroma’s Victory: The Weight of Popular Will
The following core arguments support Tchiroma’s claim — not just for the sake of argument, but to show the depth of the legitimacy challenge to Biya’s legal victory.
- Widespread ground-reports favour Tchiroma
While official tallies favour Biya, multiple reports of polling station tallies compiled by Tchiroma’s team and by independent citizens suggest that he was ahead. For example, Tchiroma claimed that his team’s field return data from “80 % of the electorate” showed him winning 55 %. Also, commentators have pointed out that in many regions the turnout figures and vote counts that favour Biya appear highly implausible, especially in conflict-affected Anglophone regions under separatist control. These reports do not by themselves constitute iron-clad proof, but they carry weight when the formal institutions have low credibility.
- The moral weight of the “will of the people”
Tchiroma emphasises that his victory is not simply a personal triumph but a people’s verdict—a majority of Cameroonians choosing change. He frames the outcome as “the truth of the ballot box” and insists that time-honoured democratic legitimacy flows from actual votes, not only from formal proclamations. In a society where democracy has been long delayed, where youth feel disenfranchised and governance has stagnated under a decades-old leader, this moral appeal resonates strongly.
- The institutional system’s credibility crisis
Even though legality was observed superficially (the Council proclaimed a winner), the institutions presiding over the process are widely viewed as biased or under the influence of the incumbent. For example, Tchiroma and analysts argue that the Council is not sufficiently independent, and that the electoral process has systemic problems of transparency and fairness. When legitimacy is weakened, the mere fact of a legal proclamation is insufficient to stabilise the polity. A legal result built on questionable legitimacy is vulnerable.
- The precedent and the risk of disenfranchisement
Historically in Cameroon, opposition candidates have raised serious concerns of vote-rigging and institutional capture. When the popular will is thwarted repeatedly, the legitimacy of the whole system suffers. If Tchiroma’s claim is correct (or at least plausible), and the electoral process has enabled a formal reversal of the will of the people, then the result is not just a legal formality – it is a deep injustice. Rejecting that injustice is not mere political posturing: it is a defence of the democratic contract between ruler and ruled.
Why the Declaration of Biya Cannot Prevail Solely on Legal Grounds
Given the above, we can argue that the formal proclamation of Biya as winner — though legal — cannot wholly override the legitimacy argument favouring Tchiroma. Several points support this claim.
- i) Legality is necessary but not sufficient for democratic authority
A system that relies on legality alone while disregarding legitimacy risks losing popular acceptance. If the governed believe that the legal result is a façade for a manipulated will, then the legal result is brittle. In that sense, the legitimacy deficit undermines the durability of the legal proclamation.
- ii) Tacit social contract and consent
Democratic authority depends not just on institutions but on the consent of the governed. If a large majority of citizens believe they have chosen Tchiroma — if polling station returns strongly indicate as much — then the moral and political authority lies with his claim. The legal authority of the Council cannot override the foundational democratic principle: that political power derives from the people.
iii) The “truth of the ballot box” norm
Tchiroma’s campaign emphasised the principle that posted results at polling stations (per Article 113 of the electoral code) are part of the record of the popular will. If those returns show him ahead, then any legal reversal becomes suspect. The normative force of the ballot box is higher than formal declarations. Thus the legalities of the Council’s proclamation become a secondary layer when they contradict the more immediate expression of voter choice.
- iv) Institutional capture and legitimacy vacuums
When institutions are widely seen as partial, the legitimacy of their rulings collapses. If the Council is perceived as biased or subordinate to the incumbent, then its decision lacks normative weight. Several observers have pointed to this dynamic in the Cameroonian context. Under such conditions, the people’s verdict regains primacy over institutional pronouncements.
Putting it all together:
- Tchiroma compiled field data and returns that suggest he won convincingly.
- The people’s will, in a context of long-standing discontent with the incumbent, aligns with change and his campaign.
- The official legal machinery (Council, electoral commission) lacks sufficient independence or credibility to definitively settle the question for legitimacy purposes.
- Therefore, even though the Council has legally declared Biya winner, the legitimacy of that outcome is undermined, and the stronger claim rests with Tchiroma.
In this light, it is not merely a dispute about numbers, but about who embodies the popular mandate. Tchiroma’s claim is that he does; the legal result says otherwise. But if legitimacy is the more fundamental criterion, then Tchiroma is the rightful victor.
The Implications and the Stakes
The implications of this struggle are profound. If the result stands in legal form but lacks legitimacy, the country faces instability: protests, refusal of compliance, erosion of state authority. Indeed, the post-election environment in Cameroon already shows signs of that: widespread protests in cities, declarations of “stolen victory” by the opposition. Conversely, recognising a victory that reflects popular will — even if the formal proclamation is delayed or contested — would strengthen democratic foundations, produce real transition, and rebuild trust.
Conclusion
The November 2025 presidential election in Cameroon confronts the classic dilemma: legality versus legitimacy. Legally, Paul Biya has been declared winner by the Constitutional Council and that is the binding institution. But legitimacy, grounded in the popular will and captured by Issa Tchiroma Bakary’s claim and data, points in a different direction. When legality and legitimacy diverge so starkly, the moral and political force lies with the latter. Therefore, one can argue strongly that Tchiroma is the rightful holder of the popular mandate and that the formal declaration in Biya’s favour cannot extinguish the legitimacy of that mandate. In the end, if governance is to be responsive and durable, the will of the people must be honoured — not merely the letter of the law.
Nkumbe Clement is Human rights officer at UN Human Rights – OHCHR regional office( Former Magìstrate at Judiciary of the Gambia)