Like Kamto like Fru Ndi
By Mwalimu Nkwelle Mesumbe, Ph.D.
Cameroon’s post-independence political history is littered with lost opportunities. There were moments when change felt within reach but slipped away because those who carried the hopes of millions of Cameroonians, made decisions that ultimately served the very regime they opposed. Two men, however, stand out in this pattern of promise and disappointment. That is Ni John Fru Ndi and Maurice Kamto. Both led bold opposition movements against President Paul Biya’s enduring grip on power. They energized the population, challenged authoritarian excesses, and expanded political imagination. Yet, tragically and ironically, both also made strategic miscalculations that helped entrench the regime they sought to dislodge.
Fru Ndi in the 1990s and Kamto in the 2010s became symbols of resistance, admired for their defiance and rhetoric. Nonetheless, protest, however passionate, becomes politically hollow when it is not backed by institutional presence. This is the shared misstep of both men. They chose to boycott key elections at pivotal junctures, Fru Ndi in 1992 and Kamto in 2020. Thus, ceding formal power structures to Biya’s ruling party and effectively handing him uncontested control of the country.
When Fru Ndi’s Social Democratic Front (SDF) party chose not to participate in the 1992 legislative and municipal elections, the logic seemed principled. He wanted to delegitimize a flawed process. But when politics abhors a vacuum, others rush in. Smaller opposition parties like the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP) led by Bello Bouba Maigari had 68 seats, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) under Augustin Frédéric Kodock had 18 seats and Dakolé Daïssala’s Mouvement pour la Défense de la République (MDR) had 6 seats.
These parties, though lacking the grassroots strength and national resonance of the SDF, were willing to cooperate with the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), enabling it to retain parliamentary control and giving the illusion of pluralism.
Fru Ndi’s decision left the SDF without legislative representation, depriving it of critical platforms for building institutional power, influencing policy, and strengthening grassroots structures.
The longer-term result was organizational decay. The SDF became a symbolic force with little leverage. Without elected positions or legislative platforms, it failed to build lasting grassroots structures or shape national discourse. Key figures like Ben Muna, Kah Walla, and many others left the party, either disillusioned or in search of political relevance elsewhere.
By the time of Fru Ndi’s death in 2023, the SDF had all but disappeared from serious political contention.
Maurice Kamto’s rise offered a fresh chance. A respected legal scholar and former minister, Kamto launched the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC) in 2012 and captured national attention with a vigorous, reform-oriented presidential campaign in 2018. His rejection of the results and subsequent arrest elevated his profile as a fearless opponent of the regime. He became, for many, the face of democratic hope.
Just like Fru Ndi, Kamto made the same error in 2020, by boycotting the legislative and municipal elections. Again, the reasons were understandable. Electoral fraud, political repression, and the worsening Anglophone crisis. But this act of protest came at the cost of institutional power.
With Kamto’s MRC off the ballot, the CPDM secured 152 of the 180 National Assembly seats, while also asserting control over 316 of the 360 local councils. The MRC forfeited the chance to anchor itself in governance structures, recruit a new generation of leaders, and translate protest into policy.
As a result, Kamto’s leadership which was once full of promise, began to unravel under the weight of this strategic miscalculation and internal dissent. He failed to build strong, sustained alliances. He alienated influential allies like Christian Penda Ekoka, a former Biya advisor turned reformist, and Michèle Ndoki, a respected lawyer who later criticized the party’s lack of internal democracy. Célestin Djamen, once a key mobilizer, also left after denouncing Kamto’s authoritarian style. Perhaps most damning was Kamto’s falling out with Paul Éric Kingué, his campaign manager in 2018 and a formidable grassroots strategist.
Their public rupture further fractured the movement, with Kingué launching his own party and accusing Kamto of sabotaging opposition unity.
The final blow which apparently might mark the end of Kamto’s political career came in 2025. In a stunning move, Kamto resigned from the MRC the very party he created, and attempted to run for president under MANIDEM, a leftist party led by Anicet Ekane. The move was confusing and legally shaky. His candidacy was rejected by both Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) and the Constitutional Council, not because of Biya’s manipulation, but due to technical violations involving dual party affiliation and procedural inconsistencies.
Kamto who is often celebrated for legal precision had disqualified himself through miscalculation.
With Kamto sidelined and the opposition fragmented, Biya will eventually face little meaningful resistance in this year’s presidential election. What could have been a moment for unified democratic challenge, has now become yet another staged ritual of continuity for a regime that thrives on disorganization and abstention among its critics. The painful truth is this: Cameroon’s opposition leaders have too often confused moral clarity with political effectiveness.
Fru Ndi and Kamto showed courage, but courage without strategy is not leadership. By staying out of the system they aimed to reform, they weakened their ability to change it. Their boycotts, however principled, were tactical gifts to Biya.
They left parliament and local councils in the hands of the CPDM, allowed state media to shape narratives without rebuttal, and robbed citizens of the sense that change could come through the ballot, however flawed.
Cameroon’s opposition must break this cycle. The next generation of leaders cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past. Protest is essential, but it is not enough. Opposition parties must compete in every election, build alliances across regions and ideologies, and use every available space, parliament, councils, courtrooms, and the streets to challenge the status quo. Sitting out only reinforces the regime’s grip.
The lesson here is not that Fru Ndi and Kamto failed because they lacked conviction. They failed because they mistook protest for power. Institutional influence is not handed out like a prize. It is seized, defended, and exercised, even on hostile terrain.
Until Cameroon’s opposition embraces this reality, Biya’s regime will continue to thrive not only because of its own strength, but because of the strategic errors of those who oppose it.
(Mwalimu Nkwelle Mesumbe, Ph.D. Comparative Oral Literature EL Teacher, Rochester Public Schools Minnesota – U.S.A. nkwellemr@yahoo.com )
